Modification of child support payments is solely a judicial function and it is the circuit court who must determine whether upon emancipation of a child, a reduction should be made pro rata or whether other equitable considerations require a different amount be paid.
Even though a parent responsible for tendering the payments may not make a unilateral pro rata reduction in the amount of unallocated child support payments upon one child’s emancipation absent an agreement to the contrary.
A non-custodial parent may not unilaterally reduce unallocated child support as each child is emancipated by reaching the age of majority, even if he continues to provide for the support of his adult children by making direct payments to them.
Where an order is entered for the support of more than one child but the order does not specify the amount of support for each child, the unilateral pro rata reduction of the support payments upon the emancipation of one child is not permissible; rather, the entire amount of support ordered must be paid until the youngest child has reach majority or until the order of support is modified.
It was improper for husband unilaterally to reduce his child support payments pro rata after children each attained majority, where he never petitioned the court for modification of the support award.
Amounts due for child support cannot be reduced pro rata automatically as each child reaches majority; a party directed to pay child support must obtain a court order to modify such payments.
A parent who has been ordered by a divorce decree to pay a collective or lump sum weekly for the support of four minor children may not unilaterally reduce the amount of such payments pro rata as each child is emancipated.
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When a petition or petition or petitions are filed which seek modification of issues determined in dissolution proceedings, all matters which are interrelated, that is, where the resolution of one affects the outcome of the other, must be determined before an appeal may be filed.
Where under the terms of a dissolution judgment, defendant had “the right to the exclusive possession of the marital home for a period of six years or until his remarriage,” and plaintiff moved to have defendant’s girl friend ousted from the marital residence to have the house sold pursuant to conditions set forth in the dissolution judgment to collect certain rental payments for the period during which the girl friend lived with defendant in the house the award of rental payments to plaintiff was plainly improper and would be set aside since the circuit court made no finding that the judgment should be reopened, and plaintiff never claimed that conditions existed which would have justified its being reopened.
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Where husband may not have been able to develop his career as successfully as he did without wife’s support in her role as the family’s designated homemaker, viewed in legal terms, their marriage, because of its duration and circumstances, constituted a “moral and financial” partnership in which the interest of each partner could be neither easily ascertained nor easily terminated because of the substantial and continuing effect that partnership had and would likely continue to have on their lives. Thus, where had and would likely continue to have on their lives. Thus, where the trial court viewed the matter as viewed the matter as if wife bore an obligation to find a full-time job to support herself, which at best would have provided her with but a fraction of husband’s income or the income they enjoyed while married, and her failure to do so precluded her from receiving any extension or increase in her maintenance, in punishing wife for what the court perceived as her lack of diligence, the court unduly encroached upon her reasonable expectations to be able to live in the future in a fashion remotely resembling how she had been able to live in the past, and her expectations in this regard were particularly reasonable in view of husband’s six-figure income; thus the gross disparity in potential incomes and the apparently drastic change in wife’s lifestyle supported her claim that her maintenance should have been extended and increased.
Where the court found husband was able to make payment to wife but had chosen to spend his money in other ways, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding husband in contempt and sentencing him to 30 days in jail.
The power of a court to enforce payment for child support by contempt is limited to cases of willful and contumacious refusal to obey the order of the court.
Where the record supported the husband’s contention that his non-payment was due to a lack of sufficient income respondent’s failure to maintain health insurance or his failure to pay medical expenses not covered by insurance was willful and contumacious.
Where the original amount of child support was below the 25% statutory guideline and the court found that children would have enjoyed a different standard of living had the marriage not been dissolved, constituting a substantial change in circumstances, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the child support, especially considering that the modified amount was raised to confirm to the statutory guidelines.
Mere fact that there has been a change in conditions is not sufficient in itself to warrant modification of provisions of divorce decree dealing with custody of a child unless those changed conditions affect the welfare of the child.
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to former husband on former wife’s petition to increase child support, where the wife alleged miscalculation of his net income and changes in the federal tax laws which increased his net income; these claims were potentially meritorious grounds for increasing child support.
Husband was not entitled to modification of support award where his non0disclosure of income prior to the circuit court’s adoption of the marital settlement agreement precluded the husband was proving that the there had been a substantial change in income necessitating modification.
Where the trial court applied a type of “sliding scale” approach to modification of child support, it erred; every time a paying parent’s increase in a like percentage, but rather, the petitioning party must show that there has been a material change in circumstances.
A modification of a judgment respecting child support may be made only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.
Subsection (a) of this section provides that a support judgment can only be modified after showing a substantial change in circumstances.
When a supporting spouse’s financial condition improves, notably where there is a discussion suggesting that increases should be made, child support payments may be required to be increased, even though there is no showing that the child’s or children’s needs have increased specifically where the original support payments did not adequately meet the children’s needs.
The wife achieved the statutory goal of rehabilitative maintenance, and the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant the husband’s motion to terminate maintenance where: (1) the wife obtained a bachelor’s degree in fine arts with honors, paid for by the husband pursuant to the trial court’s order; (2) the wife was employable, her children were emancipated, she had received a substantial amount of the marital assets, and she had no apparent health impairments that might restrict her from working; (3) the trial court’s maintenance review decision clearly reflects that the wife was under an affirmative obligation to seek appropriate employment to become self-sufficient; and (4) the record reflected that, in the four years since she graduated from college, the wife had done little toward finding gainful employment or advancing her efforts at becoming self-sufficient.
In a child support modification case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was a substantial change of circumstances justifying an increase in child support because the child’s needs increased as the child grew older and the cost of living rose, and the husband had the ability to pay the increased amount as his monthly income exceeded his expenses by more than $700; in addition, the trial court did not exceed its authority in setting child support based on the husband’s prior income because he was voluntarily unemployed and his prior income reflected his earning potential.
The increased ability of the obligor parent alone can justify an increase in child support.
